[cdn-nucl-l] It's all in the low-enriched uranium

[Robin Collins <robincol@gmail.com>]

(a  very similar version of this article also appeared in The Guardian, UK)

Mohammed ElBaradei
It's all in the low-enriched uranium

Let's create a bank to guarantee supplies to countries that need
nuclear fuel for their power reactors

Mohamed ElBaradei

From Monday's Globe and Mail
Jul. 20, 2009
President Barack Obama has injected fresh momentum into efforts -
stalled for a decade - to bring about nuclear disarmament. He has
committed himself to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and
acknowledges the link between nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states.

Mr. Obama has pledged to revitalize the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The
non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT is the cornerstone, is in
disarray. The problems are easily identified:

* The five main nuclear-weapon states have not taken seriously their
NPT obligation to work for nuclear disarmament. Instead, they have
insisted that nuclear weapons are essential for their security and
continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals. Obviously, this robs
them of the moral authority to persuade others not to acquire nuclear
weapons, which continue to be perceived as a source of power and
influence and an insurance policy against attack.

* As we have seen in the case of North Korea, there is nothing to stop
countries that sign the NPT from simply walking out after declaring
that “extraordinary events” have jeopardized their supreme interests.

* The International Atomic Energy Agency, which is supposed to police
the non-proliferation system, is shamefully underfunded. When it comes
to determining whether a country is conducting a covert nuclear
weapons program, IAEA inspectors often have their hands tied, because
they lack the legal authority to gain access to all the locations they
consider necessary, or because the IAEA's analytical laboratories are
outdated, or because the IAEA does not have adequate access to
satellite imagery.

* Export controls have failed to prevent the spread of sensitive
nuclear technology, not least due to the sophisticated efforts of
clandestine networks such as the one run by Pakistani nuclear
scientist A. Q. Khan. Nine countries already have nuclear weapons, and
it would be naive to presume that others, particularly in regions of
conflict, will not try to get hold of them.

In addition, a number of countries with nuclear energy programs have
the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of
months if their security perceptions change, because they have
mastered the critical technology - uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing. If more countries take this path, it could prove to be
the Achilles heel of non-proliferation.

* The international community, spearheaded by the United Nations
Security Council, has more often than not been paralyzed in the face
of challenges to international security and ineffectual in responding
to suspected cases of nuclear proliferation.

These issues will not be resolved overnight. But there is much that
can be done relatively quickly. The United States and Russia have
started negotiations on deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, which
together account for 95 per cent of the world's 27,000 warheads. Other
key steps include bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty; negotiating a verifiable treaty to end production of
fissile material for use in weapons; radically improving the physical
security of nuclear and radioactive materials (which is vital to
prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists); and
strengthening the IAEA.

Last month, I proposed a key measure to strengthen non-proliferation
to the IAEA's board of governors - establishing an IAEA bank of
low-enriched uranium to guarantee supplies to countries that need
nuclear fuel for their power reactors. Low-enriched uranium cannot be
used to make weapons. Some such mechanism will be essential in the
coming decades as more and more countries introduce nuclear energy.

My proposal is to create a physical stockpile of low-enriched uranium
at the disposal of the IAEA as a last-resort reserve for countries
with nuclear power programs that face a supply disruption for
non-commercial reasons. This would give countries confidence that they
could count on reliable supplies of fuel to run their nuclear power
plants, and thus do not need to develop their own uranium-enrichment
or plutonium-reprocessing capability.

This could help to avoid a repeat of Iran's experiences after its 1979
revolution, when contracts for fuel and technology for its planned
nuclear power program were not honoured. Thirty years later, some of
the consequences are still being felt.

The low-enriched uranium would be available to countries in need on
the basis of non-political and non-discriminatory criteria. It would
be accessible at market prices to all states in compliance with their
nuclear safeguards obligations. No state would be required to give up
the right to develop its own fuel cycle.

The money needed to launch such a bank is in place, thanks primarily
to a non-governmental organization - the Nuclear Threat Initiative -
and initial funding from Warren Buffett. But this can only be a first
step. It should be followed by an agreement that all new enrichment
and reprocessing activities will be placed exclusively under
multinational control, and that all such existing facilities will be
converted from national to multinational control.

This is a bold idea, but bold ideas are needed now more than ever. The
opportunity to put the nuclear fuel cycle under multinational control
was missed 60 years ago because of the Cold War. The spread of nuclear
technology and the growing risk of nuclear terrorism make it
imperative that we get it right this time.

Mohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel Peace laureate, is the outgoing
director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.