[cdn-nucl-l] CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT

["Radik Ixanov" <ixanov@sympatico.ca>]

Posted on NRC website
(http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2003/03-053.html)


NRC APPROVES CHANGES TO THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND ISSUES ORDERS FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO FURTHER ENHANCE SECURITY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after extensive deliberation and
interaction with stakeholders, has approved changes to the design basis
threat (DBT). The Commission believes that the DBT represents the largest
reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force should be
expected to defend under existing law. These changes will be issued by
Order.
In addition, the Commission has approved the issuance of two other Orders to
nuclear plants regarding work hours, training, and qualification
requirements for security personnel to further enhance protection of public
health and safety, as well as the common defense and security. The three
Orders will be issued to all 103 operating commercial nuclear power plants.

The three Orders, which are being issued today, will be effective
immediately, but allow transition periods for full implementation. With
these actions, the Commission expects that there will be a period of
regulatory stability during which operating commercial plant licensees will
be able to consolidate these and previously ordered security enhancements.

These Orders, in combination with the recently-issued Order in the area of
access authorization, enhance the already strong defense capability at these
sites using three interdependent elements directed to best protect the
public, with the appropriate resources placed at the right places. These
elements are:

the revised Design Basis Threat and associated defensive capabilities
derived from
previous measures that the Commission directed;
tighter work hour control and more robust training requirements for security
personnel,
to increase their capability to respond to threats; and
enhanced access authorization controls to ensure all plant personnel with
access
to critical areas have had the most rigorous background checks permitted by
law.
The Order that imposes revisions to the Design Basis Threat requires power
plants to implement additional protective actions to protect against
sabotage by terrorists and other adversaries. The details of the design
basis threat are safeguards information pursuant to Section 147 of the
Atomic Energy Act and will not be released to the public. This Order builds
on the changes made by the Commission’s February 25, 2002 Order. The
Commission believes that this DBT represents the largest reasonable threat
against which a regulated private security force should be expected to
defend under existing law. It was arrived at after extensive deliberation
and interaction with cleared stakeholders from other Federal agencies, State
governments and industry.

Under NRC regulations, power reactor licensees must ensure that the physical
protection plan for each site is designed and implemented to provide high
assurance in defending against the DBT to ensure adequate protection of
public health and safety and common defense and security. Extensive changes
in those physical protection plans will now be made and submitted to NRC for
approval.

The second Order describes additional measures related to security force
personnel fitness for duty and security force work hours. It is to ensure
that excessive work hours do not challenge the ability of nuclear power
plant security forces to remain vigilant and effectively perform their
duties in protecting the plants. However, the Order does include provisions
to allow increases in work hours under certain conditions, once specific
requirements are met. The NRC developed this unclassified Order through a
public process. The NRC carefully considered comments from power reactor
licensees, security force personnel, public citizen groups and other
agencies in reaching its final decision. The Order will be publicly
available on NRC’s website at: http://www.nrc.gov.

The third Order describes additional requirements related to the development
and application of an enhanced training and qualification program for armed
security personnel at power reactor facilities. These additional measures
include security drills and exercises appropriate for the protective
strategies and capabilities required to protect the nuclear power plants
against sabotage by an assaulting force. This Order requires more frequent
firearms training and qualification under a broader range of conditions
consistent with site-specific protective strategies. The details of the
enhanced training requirements are safeguards information, and will not be
released to the public. As with the DBT Order, the Commission solicited
comments on a draft training Order from cleared stakeholders, including
security personnel and took those comments under consideration in reaching
its final decision.

“With the completion of these complementary Orders,” Chairman Nils J. Diaz
said, “the public should be reassured that the nation’s nuclear power plants
are well-secured against potential threats. The NRC intends to continue
working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal
agencies, as well as with State and local law enforcement and emergency
planning officials to ensure an overall integrated approach to the security
of these critical facilities.”