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[cdn-nucl-l] Re: detection limits for underground weapons tests
Ed:
(a) According to one calculation, cavity sizes for decoupling are
33,500 cubic meters for a 1-kt explosion, 168,000 cu.m. for 5 kt, etc
(<http://geology.er.usgs.gov/eespteam/pdf/USGSOFR0128.pdf>).
Disposing of that much earth without leaving tracks in the sand or
otherwise running the risk of detection (by satellite, if nothing else)
would be a challenge almost anywhere, and especially in Iraq.
(b) I believe that no developer of A-bombs could count on reliably
achieving a yield as low as 1 kt, or even 5, on the first try, even with
a simple, gun-barrel uranium device.
Cheers,
George
Stanford
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
At 01:13 AM 2/25/2003 -0500, Edward Oleen wrote:
What
I gather from all the replys (half a dozen by
now) is that IF Saddam and his Merry Men tested a
small device (of a few tons) in a large cavity we
might detect it.