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FYI
----- Original Message -----
From: Ted Rockwell
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2002 7:49 PM
Subject: RE: Submarine K-19 water reactor." That was a spontaneous Rickover crack. He was irked at what high value some engineers placed on "performance," in a purely theoretical way. They were delighted at the high temperature the sodium plant could achieve, and the resulting "good steam conditions" in the turbine. But they didn't fully appreciate that this all washed out when you factored in the shielding required for a sodium system, the terrible thermal stresses created by sodium's high conductivity, the constant threat of sodium/water reactions, the potential need to operate massive system heaters when the reactor was down for long period (to keep the sodiium from freezing), and (the final blow)the fact that at the intermediate energies of the undermoderated neutrons, nearly 25% (as I recall) of the neutron captures in U-235 did not result in fission but in parasitic production of U-236 with virtually no energy release. So all these physics "advances" did not give us a better power plant or a better submarine. In exasperation, Rickover mused, "If the seas were sodium, some SOB at GE would be pushing water reactors." TR paste .... ----- Original Message -----
From: Ted Rockwell
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2002 11:30 AM
Subject: Submarine K-19 Friends:
Here's the attachment that didn't transmit, concerning the claim that Russian nuclear submarine technology had outstripped ours. It was printed in the Naval Institute Procedings, April 1996. Dr. Theodore Rockwell, author, The Rickover Effect (Naval Institute Press, 1994)-The Naval Institute recently issued Nautilus, a book by the British Broadcasting Company writer Roy Davies, to accompany the BBC documentary on submarines still showing worldwide. A generally good book to accompany an excellent broadcast, it ended on a sour note with some petulant remarks about how the Russians had scored "an incredible breakthrough," a liquid- metal reactor "the principle that Rickover, ten years before, had refused to reconsider ." The author had previously confided that "once Admiral [Hyman] Rick- over had set his mind against something it was not his way to allow it to be reconsidered." This "breakthrough" was deemed important "because it made possible a smaller craft." The book bemoans "the finite constraints imposed upon U.S. submarine designers by Admiral Rickover" which kept America from matching Russian sub- marines as "the best in the world." As Admiral Rickover's Technical Director during much of time in question, I'd like to set the record straight. The conclusions cited cannot be drawn from the broadcast itself, nor from the histories reported by Duncan, Hewlett and others. The Russians did develop some submarines of great speed and quietness. But these characteristics resulted primarily from hull form, hull material, jet-propulsion pumps, acoustic silencing, and other developments that were wholly out of Rickover's sphere. He had no responsibility or authority in those areas. Reducing the reactor to an infinitesimal point has little impact on ship size; the reactor is small to begin with and requires the same amount of radiation shielding regardless of size. This is illustrated by the Seawolf (SSN-575) which was cooled by liquid sodium. Although its reactor was thermally efficient, the additional shielding required for the sodium system resulted in a power plant no smaller than the equivalent pressurized water system in the Nautilus. The ship was no smaller and no faster. When the sodium plant was replaced by a water system, the ship was made no heavier by the change. So the crew was burdened with sodium' s tremendous operational disadvantages and major safety problems, with no compensating benefits. We were greatly relieved to find that water did the job and we did not have to deal with sodium. Rickover's long-range study group constantly evaluated various exotic concepts, including the lead-bismuth system used by the Russians. We would loved to have discovered a breakthrough that would lead to a reliable plant, dramatically smaller in size and weight. But we did not, presumably for the same thermodynamic and engineering reasons that power-plants ashore have not found advantages in such systems, although they have tried for decades. You don't have to take my word for this. Davies' book makes reference to some of the troubles the Russian submariners encountered. A picture caption describes the crew of the K-3 as "seemingly unaffected by continually breathing radioactive air for months on end." The text notes that the skipper Ossipenko "decided during the trials that they would carry on sailing until the radioactivity equaled 100 permissible doses. That is 100 times the maximum permissible dose. ...the air in different compartments of the submarine should be mixed up in order to reduce the effect of this radiation. ...the hatches should be opened as soon as the submarine surfaced to allow the boat to be ventilated. ...Vodka was to be used extensively for medicinal purposes to counter the effects of radioactivity." By contrast, crews on U.S. sub- marines all received less radiation than their families ashore, and no radioactive air contamination ever occurred. If this seems like a minor nuisance that sturdy sailors should cheerfully bear, we now have The Atomic Submarine History: Successes, Failures & Catastrophes by Rear Admiral Nicholas Mormul, Rear Admiral Lev Zviltsov, and Rear Admiral Academician Leonid Ossipenko (Borges, Moscow 1994). This book describes in technical detail some 15 major casualties involving Russian submarine nuclear propulsion plants, concluding "there have been hundreds of accidents on Soviet nuclear submarines, hundreds of lives lost and hundreds who have received significant doses of radiation." The authors note that in the liquid metal system, "oxides and slimes develop in the melt because of the inevitable leaks of the steam generators ...the removal of heat stops and the temperature here will rise to 1,0000 C. The channel burns through, becoming a powerful source of radioactive radiation, which, as it speeds throughout the primary, loop, degrades the radiation conditions, in spite of bio- logical protection." They describe one accident that occurred: ''as a result of leaks of the steam generator the reactor over- heated and at least 20% of the fuel elements were destroyed. Gamma radioactivity in the compartment increased sharply (more than 2000 rads in the re- actor compartment and part of the central compartment) with ejection of radioactive gases, which spread through the other compartments. The dosimetry chemists sent to the reactor compartment reported 'The instrument is off scale."' In this particular accident, all 124 crew members had been overexposed. Twenty men received significant doses of radiation (600 to 1000 rads). Several members of the crew died on the spot. Despite the spectacular speed runs, the authors report that, "because of deficiencies of weaponry, high noise levels, lengthy construction schedule and obsolescence of equipment, no more submarines of this series were built." I have never met an American submariner who would rather serve on a Russian nuclear submarine. Davies may wonder why Rickover became disenchanted with liquid metal reactors, but the Russian submariners who wrote this book outlined the problems inherent in liquid metal systems and concluded: "After a brief operation of a [reactor] with liquid metal coolant on the Seawolf they switched back to water. Unfortunately, we did not abandon the use of liquid metal coolant fast enough. |