Anybody out there listen to this Live Online discussion yesterday ? ....wonder who that person calling from Gaithersburg, Md might have been ?
Jaro
http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/02/nation_levi071802.htm
Preparedness: Dirty Bombs and Radiological Threats
With Michael Levi
Director of the Strategic Security Project, Federation of American Scientists
Thursday, July 18, 2002; Noon EDT
The events of Sept. 11, 2001, the ensuing anthrax attacks and other terrorist activities have brought the United States to a heightened level of awareness. New and alarming household words -- including "bioterrorism" and "dirty bomb" -- brought the frontlines of terror even closer to home.
What is a dirty bomb and how can we protect ourselves from a radiological attack? Radioactive materials that constitute a threat are stored in thousands of facilities around the U.S. and many may not be adequately protected. Is our government doing enough to ensure that our nuclear and radiological facilities are protected by terrorists? If an radiological attack were to occur, what evacuation procedures are in place and how should civilians reduce their level of exposure?
Michael Levi, director of the Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists, discussed what citizens and the government can do in the event of radiological attacks on Thursday, July 18, at noon EDT.
The Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists conducts independent research and promotes sound policy on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and strategic issues. Recent work has addressed missile defense, cooperative security programs with Russia, new nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, nuclear terrorism, and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.
Levi is a frequent commentator on nuclear security in the press and is a regular guest on radio and television programs. He consults often with scientific publications, congressional staffers, non-governmental organizations, and academics.
The transcript follows.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
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Michael Levi: Hi. I'm Michael Levi at the Federation of American Scientists, and I'm here to discuss dirty bombs with you. It's important to know what exactly a dirty bomb is in addressing what we should do about them, and in being prepared in case an actual attack occurs. We've done some rough simulations of what might happen in the event of an attack, which can be viewed through the link at the top of this page. Our basic conclusions were that there would be few if any immediate health effects from the radiation spread, meaning rapid evacuation is unnecessary. At the same time, we found that large areas might be considered contaminated after an attack.
Let's move to questions.
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Washington, D.C.: I am a federal employee that will soon be moving to and working in an newly-renovated office building occupied by several hundred government employees within a half-mile, north-east, of Capitol Hill. In the event of an explosion in the vicinity that leaves my building intact, how important is it, in terms of exposure to air-borne radiological elements, to have the buildings' ventilation system shutdown immediately after the explosion, assuming this was a dirty bomb? Also, will standard office building air-filtering mechanisms be sufficient to prevent most of the radiological agents from enetering the ventilation system prior to the shutdown of the ventilation system, or are special air filters required?
Thanks.
Michael Levi: This is an interesting question -- much depends on the type of radiological materials used in an attack. In general, it would be good practice to shut down external ventilation systems in the aftermath of an attack.
As far as filters are concerned, what matters more is the size of the particles produced in an attack, rather than their radioactivity. In that sense, there would be no "special" filters for a radiological incident.
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Vienna, Va.: Sir:
When it comes to safety and security proper education of public is the most important point. The term radiological bomb or attack is totally inaccurate and misleading.
RADIOLOGY is a science and a practical field of medicine. The best way to call it is RADIOACTIVE DIRTY BOMB. People must be told that the real issue is CONTAMINATION and the real task is DECONTAMINATION.
Michael Levi: You are correct that proper education of the public is essential. Contamination is the biggest problem, and decontamination will be an important ability in minimizing the effects of a dirty bomb. At the same time, we must work to prevent attacks, because our public eduation efforts may not be entirely successful.
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Washington, D.C.: How, in the event of a radiological attack, could the affected area be decontaminated?
Also, how would instructions be provided to the public within that area so they would know what to do?
Michael Levi: In most cases decontamination will be possible, given sufficient funds. Unfortunately, in many cases the cost of decontamination will exceed the value of the contaminated property. Also, we can't assume that people will be willing to return to "contaminated" areas. Even after an extensive cleanup, workers in Florida are still refusing to return to the buildings there that received anthrax letters.
Instructions would be provided to the public from the authorities, using TV and Radio.
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Gaithersburg, Md.: First I have a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering and I am involved in the environmental and health effects from the use of radiactive materials. I quickly reviewed both FAS's article "Dirty Bombs: Response to a Threat" and Dr. Kelly's testimony to Congress. While this forum is not the best to discuss the technical aspects of your studies, there are some points that need to be raised. First, it is clear that the details of the case studies have not been published in a peer reviewed journal or conference. Thus, I caution all who may read the article to understand that, in my opinion, the analysis overstates the consequences. Without access to the methodologies and knowning what, if any, computer codes were used to determine the "potential" for contamination and cancer deaths, your overall results are suspect. Also, you greatly exagerate the difficulty in cleaning up the aftermath. DOE, the military, EPA, and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission have vast amount of knowledge and expertise to perform the cleanup. In my professional opinion, in all the cases presented the affected areas could be decontaminated and brought back to productive use far quicker and at a far less cost than you and FAS state. Again, this is a topic with many detatils and history behind it that can prove my point which make it difficult to be raised in this forum.
Second, overall I agree with most of FAS's recommendations. With a reasonable amount of funding, the risk from such an attack can be tremendously reduced. The one item I would mention that FAS and Dr. Kelly have overlooked is the programs at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the "agreement" states that regulate the industrial, medical, and research use of radioactive material. They all have ongoing programs to ensure security, accountability, inspection, and emergency response to lost sources. It is also an area that all who use these radiactive materials are working on improving long before Sept. 11.
Michael Levi: Thanks for your feedback. The details of our case studies were reviewed by several experts, both inside and outside the government, and by scientists that have studied radiological weapons for the government in the past.
As I mentioned earlier, cleanup expenses can vary wildly. Some radiological materials bind chemically to surfaces, making large scale cleanup very difficult.
NRC does a good job regulating sources. But funding to act, in particular to recover orphan sources, is severely lacking.
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Washington, D.C.: FAS has taken the most extreme position on how deadly dirty bombs would be. You imply hundreds will die (by stating 1 in 100 people hit nearby with a dirty bomb will die, 1 in 1000 further out). Other groups take a very different view, for example, the National Academy of Sciences said of dirty bombs "few if any human deaths can be expected from dispersal of radiation." When you look at your assumptions, the reason for the difference is clear. The FAS "lethal" radiation dose is the same as you'd get in about four cross country plane flights (you get radiation from cosmic rays). Plus FAS assumed we'd JUST LEAVE the radioactive material on the sidewalk for 30 years while people wallow in it. By raising false alarms, you succeeded in getting Henry Kelly's (FAS President's) name in the media, but wouldn't sticking to the facts and realistic assumptions have served your mission and the public better?
Michael Levi: I'm sorry if you misunderstood our report. We performed the calculations of "potential deaths" to mimic those the EPA would conduct in deciding whether to decontaminate. Assuming in advance that decontamination would occur would make those calculations pointless. In our report, we explicitly state that few if any deaths would result from the radiation. In fact, members of the National Academy of Sciences panel have read our report and agree with its conclusions.
To be clear: Few if any radiation deaths would result from a dirty bomb attack.
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Cleveland, Ohio: Mike,
First, thanks for taking time to make yourself available to everyone.
Is there any sort of device or piece of equipment available to the general public that would be useful in the direct aftermath of a dirty-bomb explosion?
Michael Levi: There's no real need for special equipment in the hands of the general public following an attack. In fact, I'd say the most important piece of equipment would be a radio, so you can follow specific instructions from authorities. This will be the most important part of responding to an attack.
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Washington, D.C.: I spent $40 on potassium iodode tablets (IOSAT) after the Attorney General announced the capture of the dirty bomb suspect a few weeks ago. Did I just waste 40 bucks, or are the tabs some measure of protection, besides a psycholgical crutch? I heard that most of the possible nuclear materials a dirty bomber can get their hands on are of a kind diffrent than these tabs are designed to treat.
Michael Levi: Unfortunately, you've wasted 40 bucks! KI tabs only protect against radioactive iodine. Fortunately, it's unlikely that you'd need special protection after a dirty bomb attack, so not having an equivalent to KI for protecting against dirty bombs shouldn't worry you.
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Olney, Md.: What agency would be responsible for identifying radioactive contamination and damage caused by a radioactive dirty bomb? How would that agency interface with local law enforcement and emergency groups? In a theoretical radioactive dirty bomb mid-air explosion using 10 pounds of highly radioactive dust - would people be asked to evacuate or stay inside? If a dirty bomb and fire bombs were denotated simulatanously - what would we do?
Michael Levi: A variety of agencies might have equipment that could identify radioactive contamination. Most likely, the EPA would be responsible. It's been noted recently in the press that their capabilities were severly strained after 9/11, so it's important that they get up to speed.
My guess is that in the incident you described, people would be asked to stay inside. The key here is that reaction will have to be quite specific to the nature of radioactive materials used, so it will be very important to listen for detailed instructions from those who have had a chance to evaluate the precise nature of the dirty bomb used.
As for the dirty bomb/fire bomb question, I can only say that authorities are considering carefully how to respond to that.
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Fallls Church, Va.: Very interesting link on the possible risks of a dirty bomb explosion. Two questions: Does your group address the security of overseas sources of radioactive materials, i.e., Russian materials that seem to be only loosly guarded. Two: What are the radioactive materials for which potassium iodide is used for thyriod protection and what are the sources of this material? Is it likely a terrorist could get thier hands on it? I am also worried about unsecured radioactive materials used for medical testing. Any answers or comments? Thank you.
Michael Levi: Security for overseas radioactive materials is a very important area. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of Energy have just launched new efforts to secure "orphan sources" in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Senator Hilary Clinton has introduced an excellent bill addressing the security of "sealed sources" around the world, and Senator Chuck Schumer will be introducing legislation soon to confront this problem. It's also important not to lose sight of the more extreme "loose nuke" problem in Russia, and to properly protect highly enriched uranium and plutonium over there.
Potasium Iodide would be used only for incidents with radioactive iodine. The main possibile source here is from a nuclear power plant incident, which I think is highly unlikely.
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Deltona, Fla.: I'm curious about radiation sensing technology. Is there any device that could be errected around target areas which would have the ability to alert authorities of a radiological threat (such as a dirty bomb or nuclear device)?
Michael Levi: Excellent question. No detection technology is perfect, but radiation detection can be an important part of homeland security. There are improvements to be made in sensitivity and portability. Also, if we can reduce costs, it becomes much more feasible to deploy large networks of sensors. Already, some networks have apparently been deployed around Washington, DC and on I-95 between Washington and New York City.
Detecting nuclear weapons is harder, but we have some excellent technology. In fact, much of the technology developed for verifying arms control accords (e.g. sensors to tell how many warheads were in a Soviet missile) can be, and has been, adapted to border security uses.
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Washington, D.C.: In the event of an attack with a dirty bomb near my office, would it be better to stay put and await instructions or to evacuate as quickly as possible? Basically, is it better to be inside an undamaged building than to try to flee?
Michael Levi: It seems like you're on top of things here! It is better to stay inside until you get instructions.
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Montreal, Quebec: Although the attacks, so far, have been on New York and Washington, how prepared are the smaller or less "signiificant" cities in North America?
Michael Levi: Each city is making its own preparations. In one sense, this is crucial because local capabilities will have to be leveraged in our response plans. At the same time, it is important to have high quality, standardized information and training available accross the country, and, indeed, internationally, to make sure response is of the highest quality. We should set up a secure network to provide information and training to all interested municipalities and first responders.
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Fallls Church, Va. - follow up: Thanks for the information. What about radioactive materials used for medical purposes? Could they be used in a dirty bomb? What might the repercussions be? Thanks again for helping me to understand the issues.
Michael Levi: Some radioactive materials used in medicine have the potential to be used in dirty bombs, and we should carefully secure those materials. It would also take a coordinated and planned theft to acquire such materials.
It might comfort you to know that most medical materials are really too small to be used in dirty bombs. It is very important to not cast our net too broadly -- radioactive materials play a very important role in public health, so we should try to minimize the effects of our security initiatives on our health system.
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Virginia: Why focus on the U.S.? What about Russia, Israel, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa?
Michael Levi: I don't think it's an "either/or" question here. Materials may be easier to obtain abroad, but they might be difficult to get into the US. On the other hand, it might be tougher to get materials here, but one wouldn't need to get past border security.
I think countries with radioactive source problems should take an interest in securing materials themselves. After all, the only dirty bomb ever deployed (though not detonated) was placed by Chechen rebels in Moscow park several years ago.
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Gaithersburg, Md.: This is a followup. While you state that the analysis was reviewed by others, I know that "who" you ask is very important. If you are presenting such analysis in public forums then the detailed reports that has the methodologies, assumptions, and inputs must also be given as references so all of the information can be independently verified. Could you please make available at the FAS website the detailed technical reports.
Secondly, while there would likely be hot spots, that does not mean one must "throw out the baby with the bath water..." If the area cannot be immediately decontaminated, one can restrict the area of the hot spot or provide shielding. Again, there are multiple technics for cleaning up and controlling a contaminated area. Plus, if the building is of such economic, historic, or political significance, it will be decontaminated just to not let the terrorist win.
Michael Levi: You raise an interesting dilemma in the first part of your question -- how do we balance public release of information with the need not to present terrorist with a recipe for how to make a dirty bomb? We chose to make information available to trusted colleagues and officials who requested it, but not to the general public.
[comment : what on earth does "a recipe for how to make a dirty bomb" have to do with giving details of the calculations used to estimate the impact of contamination - both short & long term - on the local population & environment ??? ....note that the Canadian study of a dirty bomb impact on Montreal shares this same deficiency, and likewise appears to cover up unreasonable assumptions, such as using low-level collective dose LNT risk estimation.... Jaro ]
On the second -- you're in large part right. But there are practical limits. For example, while we might know how to decontaminate a given area, you'll have to agree that we have no experience decontaminating large urban areas. Also, while it may rationally make sense to identify and decontaminate hotspots, this may be very difficult to do in practice. As a Fire Chief noted to me, you can't tell someone that you're decontaminating his neighbor's house but that his is okay -- fear is not always rational. Whether the house is truly contaminated or not, we have to acknowledge that this will be a problem and prepare to deal with it.
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Minneapolis, Minn.: Wouldn't it be incredibly easy to destroy the US in the event of a dirty bomb attack? For example, let's suppose that a terrorist organization had a dozen of these devices, and set them off near 12 major power generation or distribution facilities. The results would be that no one would be able to work in these facilities, and power distribution on a nationl scale could be compromised for years. Assuming that these sites COULD be decontaminated, HOW LONG would it take to do so, and how would you find people willing to work in them? Or would you just build new ones, and if so, how many years to replace them? In the interim, what would happen to the US "lifestyle" and the economy? Since it's obvious that the government cannot house the millions who would be displaced by such an event, what would happen to them?
Michael Levi: I don't think you could "destroy" the US with a dirty bomb attack! As one person mentioned earlier, the cost of decontamination would have to be balanced against the value of the contaminated area. The US isn't something you can put a finite price tag on. Simply put, I think the psychology that would apply in such a situation is so far out of our experience that making predictions on scenarios like this is next-to-impossible.
You highlight an interesting overlap between dirty bombs and our power infrastructure. You could have also correctly said the same about other critical infrastructure. It's important to address the nexus of the various threats we face, and not to consider things like "dirty bombs" and "critical infrastructure" in isolation.
With regards to decontamination, time scales will vary wildly depending on the size of the affected area and on the type of material used. Also, the quicker decon is started, the easier it will be. This makes having an advance plan crucial.
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Washington, D.C.: What is the size and weight of the amount of radioactive material needed to make a fairly effective dirty bomb? Would it be possible to land a working dirty bomb onto the continent by way of a rowboat or rubber raft from a larger ship, then deliver it to its destination by way of a small car?
Michael Levi: Well, you take 4 ounces of... Actually, I'm not going to explain exactly how to make a dirty bomb. I would suggest, though, that we seek to carefully control radioactive sources of roughly 1 Curie or greater.
Delivery means for dirty bombs and for other WMD are multiple. We've got a tendency to focus on the "sexy" delivery means, like missiles. I think that this isn't a healthy approach.
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Washington, D.C.: In the event of a dirty bomb detonation in downtown D.C., I believe property values would rapidly diminish to $zero - probably for a long time - perhaps decades.
Does the federal government plan to compensate property owners in dc for these terrorist attacks? I have seen nothing about this question yet.
thanks!
Michael Levi: For WMD terrorist incidents, there is still much debate over who would assume liability. There is an arcane legal debate between insurance companies and the federal government over liability. Insurance companies want the government to pick up the tab; many lawmakers are skeptical. This is still a live issue being fought over in congress.
To see some of what's already happening on this, look at your latest notice from your car insurance company. It will likely say that they will take no responsibility for WMD terrorism incidents affecting your vehicle!
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Washington, D.C.:
I spent several years at EPA in radiation programs and was interested in your answer about trying to mimic EPA's calculations. I presume you are talking about Superfund remediation calculations, which remediate to 15 millirem? But I believe other participants have a point, here, which is that the cleanup would really be all or nothing. You'd either take (scabble) the whole sidewalk, or leave it be. It would be too hard to carefully remove just enough contamination to ensure 15 millirem of material is left. Better and faster to remove the whole sidewalk. Same with contaminated soils. That's what eperience tells, but you may have had some other purpose in your calculations.
Michael Levi: This is of course a very sensitive issue. I'm inclined to agree with you, but there are of course many who think otherwise! You'd probably agree, though that if the initial contamination level were below 15 millirem, no cleanup or demolition would be mandated. We were trying to identify when decon would be *mandated*, which is why we looked at the 15 millirem level.
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Gaithersburg, Md.: You may not be able to answer this based on time, but there are ways of presenting detailed reports and not releasing those details that give away trade or national secrets. The NRC does this all the time with proprietary information. Please consider doing something similar or let a person like me know how we could request and receive the detailed info for our own independent professional review once you have verified who we are.
Thanks in advance.
Michael Levi: Send me an email if you're interested in taking further -- ssp@fas.org
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Olney, Md.: I understand that KI is recommended only for incidents involving nuclear reactors, since it is only effective at blocking the uptake of radioactive iodine. I understand that a dirty bomb would probably use cesium or cobalt, or something other than iodine. What I haven't been able to determine is how or why nuclear reactors would produce radioactive iodine, and whether that radioactive iodine could be used to make a dirty bomb, or if sabotaging a reactor or nuclear waste disposal or holding site would disperse radioactive iodine.
Thank you for your time.
Michael Levi: Radioactive iodine is produced as a byproduct of the nuclear fission reaction that would occur in a meltdown (or in a true nuclear bomb). Since there's no fission in a dirty bomb, this wouldn't happen. Also, since radioactive iodine decays quickly (8 day 1/2-life), it would be hard for a terrorist to use it.
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Somewhere, USA -- EPA Employee: This is more a comment than question, but I would be interested in your reaction.
I work in the EPA program that has been mentioned in the press recently -OSWER internal report on lessons learned from the attacks.
In speaking with friends and family regarding the risks associated with rad and other weapons that may be used against the masses, I emphasize to them that they should be analytically critical -but not overly suspicious] of the information they recieve from the government and media. Particularly in a time of (immediate) crisis, do not simply do what you are told without thinking it through. Consider the source, and balance your actions against the motives that authority might have for instructing you the way it has.
There are institutional imperitives that come into play during crises which could adversely affect a small number of people, perhaps to the benefit of the larger group, perhaps not. For example, the postal service chose to accept the relatively minor cost of a few illnesses/deaths among its employees rather than accept the greater cost (to the nation?) of immediately closing down the service at the slightest hint of a health threat.
From a broad policy perspective, decisions like this will be made without doubt. Know this to be true.
The question for you and your loved ones to answer is how can you act/react in such a way as to anticipate such vulnerabilities and protect yourselves.
There is no subsitute for dispassionate and hard critical assessments of all that we are told, and it is wise to suspend trust in our authorities (but to act to protect your loved ones, calmly, and in a way that is fully respectful of our greater humanity).
Michael Levi: Don't have time now to give comments, but I think other readers will be interested in seeing your insights.
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Germantown, Md.: In your responce to emergency preparedness, don't we still have the Civil Defense organization in some form that can be resurrected and given responsibility for a national standard on emergency response to a dirty bomb?
Michael Levi: Nothing that would make much sense. The most natural candidates for standardization would be the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) or the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST). Some of this is being addressed in the Homeland Security legislation now before Congress.
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Michael Levi: It's time to wrap up this discussion. Thank you all for your excellent questions! For more information on dirty bombs and on issues of WMD terrorism, check out our website at www.fas.org.
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washingtonpost.com:
That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.